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A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Paul E. McGreal*
INTRODUCTION
Textualism preaches two unalterable truths regarding statutory interpretation.
First, the judge's proper focus is the statute's text.' Second, the judge shall not
consult legislative history in interpreting that text.2 The textualist method largely
rests upon these two pillars.
This Article argues that textualists ignore an equally fundamental aspect of the
interpretive enterprise: the inseparability of text and context. That is, a text's mean-
ing becomes determinate only when paired with a specific context.3 For example,
* Harry & Helen Hutchens Research Professor and Professor of Law, South Texas
College of Law. I wish to thank all those who commented on prior drafts of this Article,
including Kathleen Bergin, Bruce Burton, Maxine Goodman, Leandra Lederman, Val Ricks,
Dru Stevenson, and Kevin Yamamoto.
See, e.g., CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 155 (2002) ("Textualism's central tenet is that the focus of
statutory interpretation should be the statutory text that was duly enacted according to
constitutional procedures."); Jeffrey G. Miller, Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr.
Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, 20 PACE L. REv. 409, 411 (2000) (noting that for new
textualists, "[i]nterpreting statutes begins and ends with the text of the statutes"); Stephen A.
Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VIL. L. REv. 93, 94-95 (1995) ("The gist
of textualist construction is that judges should be controlled by text and stay away from
legislative history at all costs."); Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as
Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585, 586 (1994) ("[T]extualism posits that judges should
not use extraneous sources, such as legislative history when interpreting ambiguous statutory
text, [but] should rely on the texts themselves.").
2 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(1990) ("The new textualism posits that once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain
meaning, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant."); Thomas W. Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 351, 351-52 (1994)
("Textualism is not simply a revival of the old plain meaning rule.... In practical terms, the
principal implication ... is to banish virtually all consideration of legislative history from
statutory interpretation.").
3 Of course, the possible meanings of words are not boundless, and context will help us
select among possible meanings given the words' usages and the rules of syntax. One com-
mentator illustrates this point with the following example: "No amount of context will cause
me to conclude that 'Bill hit John' really means, 'the air conditioner on the train was broken,
and all the passengers were sweating when they got off.' Rather, context makes certain
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consider a sign that admonishes, "Keep off the grass."4 Hanging on the wall of a
drug rehabilitation clinic, the sign implores abstention from drugs, 5 but when
planted in a well-manicured lawn, the sign enjoins passersby from stepping on the
turf.' Pairing the same text with different contexts changes the text's meaning.
The text-context link is so fundamental that, even when words appear in
isolation, we must hypothesize a context to make sense of those words. Consider
a professor who receives an anonymous note that simply reads, "Drop dead."7 To
fix meaning on these words, the professor must pair them with a hypothetical
context. 8 For example, perhaps a colleague with a sense of humor wrote the note
after a light-hearted disagreement.9 Or, perhaps the note is from a disgruntled
former student who received a failing grade.'0 Paired with the former context, the
note is a joke; paired with the latter context, the note is more ominous. Selecting a
hypothetical context selects meaning. Similarly, changing context can alter meaning
just as radically as changing text, as every text-context pairing potentially has a
different meaning.
Yet, the constitutional argument for textualism drives a wedge between text
and context. Consider the view of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, whose
extensive judicial and other writings defend the practice." He argues from the
Constitution's lawmaking process, noting that only a statute's text passes through
the constitutionally-prescribed lawmaking steps of bicameralism (passage by both
chambers of Congress) and presentment (delivery of the bill for the President's
signature or veto).'2 Conversely, legislative history materials, such as committee
reports and floor debates, do not pass through bicameralism and presentment.
Consequently, only the statute's text, and not its legislative history, is const-
itutionally enacted "law" entitled to interpretive weight.
possible interpretations more salient and others less salient." Lawrence M. Solan, Learning
Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 235, 257.
' I borrow this example from Gerald Graff, "Keep off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and
Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEx. L. REv. 405,407 (1982).
' See id. at 407-08.
6 See id. at 407.
See id. at 408-09.
8 See id. at 409.
9 See id.
't See id.
i One commentator notes, "Justice Scalia does not merely advocate a particular
interpretive approach - he fairly crusades for it." MAMMEN, supra note 1, at 155; see, e.g.,
Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role
of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Of course, if the President vetoes a bill, a super-
majority of both houses of Congress is needed to override the veto. Id.
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This bicameralism and presentment argument is both incoherent and incomplete.
It is incoherent because statutory interpretation cannot proceed on text alone - text
must be paired with a context. The argument is incomplete because it is silent on
the proper context with which to pair statutory text. And this silence is ironic.
While textualists like Justice Scalia invoke the Constitution to prohibit consideration
of legislative history, 3 faithful adherence to constitutional text and structure actually
requires such consideration. This disconnect derives from textualism' s misdirected,
laser-like focus on the result of the bicameralism and presentment process -
statutory text - to the exclusion of the process itself. Yet, the Constitution's text
and structure treat bicameralism and presentment as important for its process as well
as its result. Thus, legislative deliberation, as reflected in legislative history, is not
like so much chafe to be discarded after the final vote.
This Article has two parts. Part I describes the textualist constitutional argument
against legislative history in statutory interpretation, focusing on the judicial and
other writings of Justice Scalia. Part H1 then critiques the textualist constitutional
argument and explains how constitutional text and structure actually require judges
to consider legislative history when interpreting federal statutes.
I. THE TEXTUALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Justice Scalia's rejection of legislative history and corresponding embrace of
textualism is most extensively defended in his essay Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws.'4 As the title suggests, common-law reasoning is the
springboard for his criticism. Simply put, Justice Scalia believes that the common-
law method is poorly suited to statutory interpretation, and that judicial consider-
ation of legislative history entails many of the same problems as common-law
reasoning.' 5 Section A explains Justice Scalia' s critique of common-law lawmaking.
Section B then explains how his critique of common-law lawmaking leads him to
reject legislative history.
A. The Common-Law Attitude
Justice Scalia begins his essay with a description and critique of the common-
law method." The common law is the milieu of most first year law school classes,
'3 See Scalia, supra note 11, at 35; MAMMEN, supra note 1, at 161-62.
"' See Scalia, supra note 11. Throughout this discussion, I also refer to the work of
Professor John F. Manning, a leading academic advocate of rejecting legislative history.
Professor Manning's work shares many arguments and premises with that of Justice Scalia.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 3-9.
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where students mostly study judicial decisions, not legislative texts.17 Those
decisions discuss "some policy reasons 18 and "earlier opinions"' 9 of other judges,
but "not a single snippet of statutory law,""0 because the common law "was almost
entirely the creation and domain of English judges."'" With no controlling statute,
common-law judges were the lawmakers, not simply interpreters and appliers of
existing rules.
Famous old cases are famous, you see, not because they came
out right, but because the rule they announced was the intelligent
one. Common-law courts performed two functions: One was to
apply the law to the facts. All adjudicators - French judges,
arbitrators, even baseball umpires and football referees - do
that. But the second function, and the more important one, was
to make the law.22
And to truly make law, courts must adhere to a concept like stare decisis that re-
quires judges to follow prior decisions.23 Otherwise, those decisions "would not be
making any 'law'; they would just be resolving the particular dispute before them. 24
Stare decisis, however, permits judges substantial discretion. The decision
whether to follow or distinguish precedent is largely unguided, leaving much room
for judicial creativity. Indeed, Justice Scalia offers a cynical description of common-
law practice, suggesting that the analysis is result-driven.25 The common-law judge
first exercises reason and "the brilliance of one's own mind"26 to identify "the 'best'
legal rule. 27 Next, she either follows or distinguishes precedent depending on
whether it supports her preferred rule.28 Justice Scalia summarizes as follows:
[T]he great judge - the Holmes, the Cardozo - is the man (or
woman) who has the intelligence to discern the best rule of law
for the case at hand and then the skill to perform the broken-
field running through earlier cases that leaves him free to impose
17 See id. at 3--6.
I id. at 5.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 6.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 7.
24 id.
25 See id. at 8-9, 13.
21 Id. at 7.
27 Id.
28 id.
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that rule: distinguishing one prior case on the left, straight-
arming another one on the right, high-stepping away from
another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until
(bravo!) he reaches the goal - good law.2 9
This is the common-law "attitude" - a judge's willingness to independently deter-
mine the best rule and, through creative manipulation of existing precedent, impose
that rule in a given case.3 °
Justice Scalia next argues that the common-law attitude contradicts three con-
stitutional values. First, judge-made law is inconsistent with separation of powers
in our democratic government. 3' Democracy commands that only accountable
decision-makers make law.32 As only Congress and the President are accountable
to the people, only those branches, and not the unaccountable judiciary, may make
and execute the law.33
The second and third constitutional values relate to the prohibition of ex post
facto laws. 34 Generally speaking, a legislature must enact prospective rules that
govern post-promulgation conduct. Conversely, common-law rules are made long
after the parties' conduct has occurred, while the case is pending. The ex post facto
nature of common-law rules prompts two objections. First, parties have no prior
notice of the rule under which their conduct will later be judged. Second, because
the common-law judge knows who will benefit from different holdings, she may
29 Id. at 9.
30 Id. at 13.
31 Id. at 9-13.
32 See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALEL.J. 529,530
(1997) (reviewing Scalia, supra note 11, and describing his view as democratic formalism,
meaning that the argument "is designed to ensure that judgments are made by those with a
superior democratic pedigree").
31 See Scalia, supra note 11, at 9-13. At this point, Justice Scalia makes an awkward
admission - the founding generation believed that common-law judges "discovered" the
principles of the common law and thus were not engaging in lawmaking as legislatures do.
Id. at 10. He nonetheless feels justified in taking the modem, more "realistic view" that
common-law judges make law as the appropriate grounds for his separation of powers
critique of the common-law attitude. Id. This concession has two potential problems. First,
it holds one historical assumption constant while changing another without explanation. For
example, Justice Scalia changes the Founders' assumption regarding the nature of common-
law lawmaking, but holds constant the Founders' conception of democracy and separation
of powers. Why not do the opposite? Second, his argument assumes that a change in the
Founders' assumption regarding the nature of common-law lawmaking should not affect the
proper conception of separation of powers or democracy. If the Founders had held a more
realist view of judicial decision making, perhaps their notions of separation of powers and
democracy would have been different. Again, he offers no explanation for leaving un-
modified the original view of separation of powers and democracy.
3 See id. at 11-14; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be
passed.").
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indulge her biases and prejudices in reaching a decision. The parties, however, will
be none the wiser because of the almost unlimited ability to manipulate precedent
to justify any decision.35
B. The Common-Law Attitude and Statutory Interpretation
Next, Justice Scalia turns to legislative history and legislative intent, arguing
that judicial consideration of those sources poses the same problems as common-law
lawmaking.36 Before examining his arguments, however, it would be helpful to
examine precisely what he means by legislative history and legislative intent. As
to legislative history, Scalia means the conventional sources that lawyers consult to
determine what was said and happened during Congress's consideration and
enactment of a statute. As examples, he mentions, "the statements made in the floor
debates, committee reports, and even committee testimony."37 Thus, Justice Scalia
uses the term in its conventional sense.
As to legislative intent, his meaning is more difficult to discern. Commentators
generally acknowledge three versions of legislative intent. First, one might mean
subjective legislative intent, focusing on the subjective views of individual legis-
lators regarding the precise interpretive question before the court.38 For example,
if the issue is whether a federal statute requires a successful tort plaintiff to include
punitive damages in income, we would ask what individual legislators believed
" Scalia, supra note 11, at 9-14. Justice Scalia quotes an early commentator who nicely
summarizes the point:
Judge-made law is special legislation. The judge is human, and
feels the bias which the coloring of the particular case gives. If he
wishes to decide the next case differently, he has only to distinguish,
and thereby make a new law. The legislature must act on general
views, and prescribe at once for a whole class of cases.
Id. at 11 (citing Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (July 4, 1836), in KERMIT L. HALL ET
AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 318 (1991)).
36 See Scalia, supra note 11, at 14-23. Scalia argues:
if one accepts the principle that the object of judicial interpretation is
to determine the intent of the legislature ... [then] [t]he practical threat
is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unex-
pressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their
own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities
from the common law to the statutory field.
Id. at 17-18.
17 Id. at 29.
38 See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:06 (6th ed.
2000) (noting the view that intent is inherently subjective because "intention is a mental state
[which] . . .only an individual can have .... This view implies that the concept of a
legislative intent is useful only if it is understood as the sum of the individual ideas, views,
and attitudes of all of the members of the legislature").
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about that specific question.39 Second, one might mean objective legislative intent., °
This approach seeks the policies and values that the enacting Congress sought to
promote, and then interprets the statute to best achieve those policies and values.4
On the punitive damages question, that would mean asking what policy or value
underlies the applicable provision of the tax code, and whether including punitive
damages would better achieve that policy or value. Third, one might mean the
purposivist approach to statutory interpretation. This approach asks what evil or
problem Congress sought to address, and what interpretation best solves that evil
or problem."'
While Justice Scalia never explains which version of legislative intent he is
referring to, a fair reading of his essay is that he objects to all three. He implies this
in his statement that statutory interpretation ought to focus on the legislature's
"'objectified' intent," which he describes as "the intent that a reasonable person
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the
corpus juris. '1 3 For Justice Scalia, the only legitimate, acknowledged sources of
statutory interpretation are the text of the statute to be interpreted as well as the texts
of other statutes."M
39 The punitive damages example is taken from O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79
(1996). For a discussion of the interpretive issues raised by O'Gilvie, see Paul E. McGreal,
Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary Speech in Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN.
L. REV. 325, 358-61 (2004) [hereinafter McGreal, Slighting Context].
0 McGreal, Slighting Context, supra note 39, at 375-77 (discussing "purposivism" in
determining legislative intent).
4' Of course, difficulties arise when a statute reflects either a compromise of conflicting
values or a decision to pursue a single value only so far.
42 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 220 (3d ed. 2001); see also
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); EARLT. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OFSTATUTES § 163, at 247-48 (1940).
[I]n seeking to ascertain legislative purpose, the court will resort,
among other things, to the circumstances existing at the time of the
law's enactment, to the necessity for the law and the evil intended to
be cured by it, to the intended remedy, to the law prior to the new
enactment, and to the consequences of the construction urged.
Id. (footnote omitted).
43 Scalia, supra note 11, at 17.
44 Id. at 23 ("I agree with Holmes's other remark, quoted by Justice Jackson: 'We do not
inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means."') (quoting OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920), quoted in Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)). But see
United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444-45 (1988) (opining for the Court, Justice Scalia
uses a Senate committee report to identify the purpose of the legislation); John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 702-05 (1997) (identi-
fying extra-textual sources routinely used by textualists).
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Justice Scalia cannot possibly mean what he says. Text has no determinate
meaning outside of a context,, and he completely ignores the question of which
context the interpreter should pair with a statute's text. This is a choice Justice
Scalia must make, even implicitly, if he is to give a statute meaning. 5 For now,
though, we will put this point aside, focusing instead on why he believes judicial use
of legislative history is as problematic as common-law lawmaking.
1. Separation of Powers
Justice Scalia's separation of powers argument against legislative history rests
on three aspects of the Constitution's legislative process. First, he looks to the law-
making process set forth in Article I, section 7 of the Constitution: bicameralism and
presentment.4 6 According to that provision, "[e]very Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be present-
ed to the President of the United States."47 If the President signs the bill or leaves it
unsigned for ten days, the bill becomes law.' If the President objects to the bill, the
President can veto the bill by returning it with his objections to the chamber of
Congress that originated the bill.4 9 Congress can then enact a law over the
President's veto only if two-thirds of both houses thereafter approve the bill. ° Only
" See McGreal, Slighting Context, supra note 39, at 337-39. Professor Manning notes
that Justice Scalia routinely applies context derived from outside the legislative process. See
Manning, supra note 44, at 702-05.
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see Scalia, supra note 11, at 9-10, 35.
47 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
41 Id. There is an important exception to the rule that a bill will become a law if left
unsigned by the President for more than ten days - the pocket veto. A pocket veto occurs
when a law is passed and Congress adjourns its two-year term before the ten-day limit on a
bill has expired. Id. The President may use the pocket veto to object to a bill. Under the
pocket veto, a bill will not become a law if the President does not sign the bill within ten
days of when Congress has adjourned a session after presenting the law to the President, but
before the end of the ten-day period. Id. (a bill becomes law if not signed within ten days
"unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return in which Case it shall not be
a Law"). See John Houston Pope, Note., The Pocket Veto Reconsidered, 72 IOWA L. REV.
163, 164 (1986). In the case of a pocket veto, Congress has deprived the President of the
ability to "return" the bill to Congress with the President's objections -the veto - and the
bill will not become a law even if the President does not act on the bill within the ten days.
The pocket veto is recognized by congressional practice and has not been adjudicated by the
Supreme Court. While Presidents have used the pocket veto during interim adjoumments or
adjournments at the end of a session, id. at 164-65, one federal court of appeals has held that
the pocket veto only operates at the final adjournment of a Congress's two-year term, id. at
165; see also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated sub nora., Burke v.
Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (holding that the case was moot).
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
50 Id. at § 7.
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a bill that runs this gauntlet becomes a "law" entitled to enforcement by the President
and application by the federal courts. 5 This is bicameralism and presentment."
As bicameralism and presentment is the Constitution's only lawmaking process,
it follows (for Justice Scalia) that only materials that pass through each step of that
process are law. While the same text must receive a majority vote in both chambers
of Congress and be signed by the President (or overcome the President's veto),53 the
materials that constitute legislative history - committee reports, floor statements,
etc. - are neither voted on by both chambers of Congress nor submitted to the
President. 4 Thus, text, but not legislative history, satisfies this constitutional
criterion of bicameralism and presentment.
Of course, this argument is incomplete. While interpretation requires judges to
pair statutory text with some context, Justice Scalia's bicameralism and presentment
argument merely rejects legislative history without identifying another source of
context. Presumably, whatever source he uses must satisfy the requirements of bi-
cameralism and presentment.55
Justice Scalia's second separation of powers argument rests on a non-delegation
principle. He explains this point in a concurring opinion in Bank One Chicago,
N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.,56 a case in which the Court's opinion heavily
relied on congressional committee reports. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens defended the Court's use of committee reports, arguing that members of
"l Id. art. II, § 3 (The President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.");
id. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States ....").
52 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto
Act violates presentment by allowing the President to amend effectively a law without action
by both chambers of Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that a legis-
lative veto violates the constitutional requirement of bicameralism and presentment).
53 See MAMMEN, supra note 1, at 155 ("Textualism's central tenet is that the focus of
statutory interpretation should be the statutory text that was duly enacted according to consti-
tutional procedures.").
4 Scalia proposed the following example:
If... a citizen performs an act - let us say the sale of certain
technology to a foreign country - which is prohibited by a widely
publicized bill proposed by the administration and passed by both
houses of Congress, but not yet signed by the President, that sale is
lawful. It is of no consequence that everyone knows both houses of
Congress and the President wish to prevent the sale. Before the wish
becomes a binding law, it must be embodied in a bill that passes both
houses and is signed by the President.
Scalia, supra note 11, at 25.
" See Manning, supra note 44, at 705 ("[T]extualists' approach to terms of art (as well
as other elements of statutory context) further highlights the textualist paradox: why must
some, but not all, sources of law elaboration hew to the command of Article I, Section 7?").
56 516 U.S. 264 (1996).
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Congress are "busy people" who will logically rely on the work of their trusted
colleagues (e.g., committee members) to shape and define legislation.57 Thus, "the
intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly regarded as the intent of
the entire Congress."58
Justice Scalia's response is worth quoting in full:
[A]ssuming Justice Stevens is right about this desire to leave
details to committees, the very first provision of the Constitution
forbids it. Article I, § 1, provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."
It has always been assumed that these powers are nondeleg-
able - or, as John Locke put it, that legislative power consists
of the power "to make laws .... not to make legislators." No
one would think that the House of Representatives could
operate in such fashion that only the broad outlines of bills
would be adopted by vote of the full House, leaving minor
details to be written, adopted, and voted upon only by the cog-
nizant committees. Thus, if legislation consists of forming an
"intent" rather than adopting a text (a proposition with which I
do not agree), Congress cannot leave the formation of that intent
to a small band of its number, but must, as the Constitution says,
form an intent of the Congress.59
Under bicameralism and presentment, material approved by less than the whole
Congress is not law;6° Congress cannot change this fundamental feature of the
Constitution's design. House or Senate committees, of course, are only subsets of
Congress; their reports are not a product of the whole Congress 6' and are not
5' Id. at 276 (Stevens, J., concurring).
58 Id. at 276-77(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative
Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 780-84 (1966) (explaining the delegation view of legislative
history).
" Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 280 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added and omitted) (internal citations omitted). As discussed earlier,
Justice Scaliajoins with those commentators who believe that an "intent" of a multi-member
body like Congress is an incoherent notion. See id. ("There is no escaping the point:
Legislative history that does not represent the intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative;
and legislative history that does represent the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful.").
'o See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the
President .. ").
6 Of course, the unitary legislature argument leaves open the possibility that some source
1276
[Vol. 13:1241
A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
presented to the President. Thus, giving interpretive weight to committee reports
delegates lawmaking power to a subset of Congress.6 2
Note once again how Justice Scalia ignores the necessity of context. Implicit
in his argument is that statutory text has some meaning on its face, and that congres-
sional committees may not alter that meaning through legislative history. However,
the statute's so-called facial meaning necessarily assumes a context within which
that meaning makes sense. Justice Scalia once again neglects the question of what
context properly informs the interpretation of a statute. Presumably, given his
non-delegation argument, the context must (like text) reflect a constitutional under-
standing of Congress's proper role.63
A third separation of powers argument derives from Congress's term of office.
Under Article I, we elect the entire House and one-third of the Senate every two
years.' Each Congress, then, has a two-year lawmaking mandate; after that two-
year period, the legislative power devolves upon the next Congress. Each Congress's
sole legacy is its statutes, and each statute represents a particular Congress's ap-
proach to a problem or issue. Consequently, each statute is a product of its time -
of the learning, resources, and ideology (among other things) of the Congress that
created it.
As times change, the problem addressed by a statute might also change or
disappear; the statute's solution might seem unworkable or ill-conceived, or produce
of legislative history may reflect the intent of Congress as a whole. For example, Justice
Scalia acknowledges that such intent might be found in a proposed statutory amendment that
was rejected by both houses. See Antonin Scalia, Speech at Various Law Schools on the Use
of Legislative History 4 (Fall 1985-Spring 1986) (a speech given while he was a judge on
the District of Columbia Circuit) (on file with author). If a party later offers an interpretation
of the statute consistent with that amendment, one could argue that Congress, acting as a
whole, has rejected that interpretation. Id. Yet, such arguments are not without problems;
perhaps Congress rejected the amendment as redundant. Also, this argument still fails the
bicameralism and presentment argument. The rejected amendment is only that - a piece of
legislation that never achieved the status of law. If the text passed by Congress is susceptible
to an interpretation consistent with the rejected amendment, then so be it - the text is the
only source we have with the status of law.
62 As Justice Scalia has stated elsewhere, such a delegation creates a "junior-varsity
Congress" and is unconstitutional. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,427 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Professor Manning similarly argues that the Constitution bars con-
gressional delegation of lawmaking power to a subset of that body, and that judicial use of
legislative history enables such a delegation. See Manning, supra note 44, at 696-99.
63 Here, Professor Manning goes beyond Justice Scalia's incomplete approach. See infra
note 103.
- U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, § 3, cl. 2.
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unexpected consequences. 65 All of these new matters are the province of later
Congresses:
The principle of our democratic system is not that each legis-
lature enacts a purpose, independent of the language in a statute,
which the courts must then perpetuate, assuring that it is fully
achieved but never overshot by expanding or ignoring the
statutory language as changing circumstances require. To the
contrary, it seems to me the prerogative of each currently elected
Congress to allow those laws which change has rendered
nugatory to die an unobserved death if it no longer thinks their
purposes worthwhile; and to allow those laws whose effects
have been expanded by change to remain alive if it favors the
new effects.'
If judges may adjust a statute to meet change, they will do so by adapting the
goals of the prior, enacting Congress (long since out of power) to new cir-
cumstances. Such interpretive adaptation is a form of constructive amendment.
However, the Constitution reserves the power to amend federal statutes to the
current Congress. Thus, judges should not aid and abet a prior Congress's bid for
political immortality - and usurp the power of future Congresses - by adapting
unenacted legislative "intents" or "purposes."
To illustrate Justice Scalia's point, consider a communications law passed
before the age of television or the Internet. If television or the Internet fit within the
text of the statute, then the statute applies. If not, judges must not use the purpose
of the enacting Congress to determine how that Congress would treat the new
technologies. Otherwise, judges would give the enacting Congress legislative power
beyond its democratically authorized term. The changed circumstances are a matter
for the current Congress to address through bicameralism and presentment.
Again, the argument is incomplete. Justice Scalia gives us reason to focus on
a statute's text, but offers no account of the proper context within which to under-
stand that text. Presumably, we should search for the context at the time of
enactment, not after the term of the enacting Congress has expired. Beyond that,
however, he offers no guidance.
6 See generally GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)
(providing solutions for dealing with obsolete laws).
' K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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2. Inadequate Notice
Recall that common-law lawmaking operates in an ex post facto manner, with
the legal rule announced after the parties' conduct has occurred. This effectively
deprives people of notice of the law's requirements, denying them the opportunity
to conform their actions to the law. In the following passage, Justice Scalia turns
this argument against legislative intent:
[Ilt is simply incompatible with democratic government, or
indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law
determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the
lawgiver promulgated. That seems to me one step worse than
the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts
high up on the pillars, so that they could not easily be read.
Government by unexpressed intent is similarly tyrannical. It is
the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.67
Legislative intent allows judges to play a game of bait-and-switch. Congress enacts
a text with one meaning, upon which people rely in ordering their affairs. Courts
then defeat this reliance by using legislative intent to substitute a different meaning.
As with the separation of powers arguments, the notice argument rests on an
assumption that the bare text has a different meaning from that suggested by
legislative history. Bare text is a misnomer, however, as any reading of a text
assumes a corresponding context. Justice Scalia neither identifies which context he
favors, nor explains why that context better serves the dictates of fair notice than
does legislative history.
3. Disguised Personal Preference
Justice Scalia's third critique of common-law lawmaking was that it allowed
judges to indulge personal preferences and biases. Legislative history poses the
same problem:
The practical threat is that, under the guise or even the self-
delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-
law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires,
extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to
the statutory field. When you are told to decide, not on the basis
of what the legislature said, but on the basis of what it meant,
67 Scalia, supra note 11, at 17.
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and are assured that there is no necessary connection between
the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant
is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have
meant; and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the
law means what you think it ought to mean - which is precisely
how judges decide things under the common law. 8
Further, like stare decisis, legislative history only weakly constrains judicial
discretion:
Legislative history provides, moreover, a uniquely broad
playing field. In any major piece of legislation, the legislative
history is extensive, and there is something for everybody. As
Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look over the
heads of the crowd and pick out your friends. The variety and
specificity of result that legislative history can achieve is
unparalleled. 69
Therefore, a judge using legislative history, like her common-law counterpart, sits
as a super-legislature, making retroactive legal rules under the guise of interpreting
the legislature's intent.
The legislative history judge is not the only villain in this drama. The scene is
also populated by lobbyists, legislative staffers, and unscrupulous legislators who
cram committee reports, floor speeches, and the like with deceptive statements.
"One of the routine tasks of the Washington lawyer-lobbyist is to draft language that
sympathetic legislators can recite in a prewritten 'floor debate' - or, even better,
insert into a committee report."7 The picture painted is of legislators and lobbyists
who lost their bid to get preferred language into a bill's text, but then sought a
partial victory by inserting favorable legislative history. On this view, much legis-
lative history is the tainted product of political gamesmanship.
68 Id. at 17-18.
69 Id. at 36.
70 Id. at 34. Scalia adds that members of Congress seldom participate in the creation of
most legislative history materials:
The floor is rarely crowded for a debate, the members generally being
occupied with committee business and reporting to the floor only when
a quorum call is demanded or a vote is to be taken. And as for
committee reports, it is not even certain that the members of the issuing
committees have found time to read them ....
ld. at32.
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As should be familiar by now, Justice Scalia again assumes a sharp distinction
between the meaning conveyed by plain text and that conveyed by legislative
history. As before, he ignores that text has a determinate meaning only when paired
with some context, and he never explains what context he is using and why.
Without such an explanation, his textualism is open to the same charge of manip-
ulation as are legislative history and common-law judging. For all we know, bias,
prejudice, or personal policy preferences drive the choice of interpretive context.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE TEXTUALIST CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
A persistent theme of Part I.B is how Justice Scalia's textualist argument
separates text and context. He consistently focuses on the statutory text that
emerges from the constitutional lawmaking process of bicameralism and present-
ment, but ignores the equally important choice of the context within which to
understand that text. As the next three sections explain, this failure ultimately
undermines each of his arguments against legislative history and points the way to
a firmer, constitutional role for those materials.
A. Separation of Powers
Each of Justice Scalia's three separation of powers arguments assumes that
statutory text - but not legislative history - has unique constitutional significance.
His assumption is premised on three grounds: first, that only text survives bicam-
eralism and presentment; 71 second, that only text is the product of the entire
legislature rather than the work of a subset, such as a committee;72 and third, that
only text reflects the specific choices of the enacting Congress, whose term of office
has since expired." All three of these arguments, however, share a mistaken
assumption: that bicameralism and presentment are significant only for their result,
i.e., the text that emerges from the process.
Bicameralism and presentment are also significant as a process - a series of
steps that mold and shape statutory text into the final product that enters the United
States Code. Specifically, bicameralism and presentment are a process intentionally
constructed to generate public debate about legislation. Consequently, legislative
history - which memorializes such debate - is a valued part of the process, not
merely a disposable byproduct left over after text takes its final form. Under this
71 See WIULAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226 (1994).
72 See id.
71 See K Mart Corp., v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 327 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (criticizing Brennan's reliance on external factors when
interpreting a trademark statute and noting that the prior Congress chose not to create a
statutory exemption when drafting the law).
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conception, both text (the statute's words) and context (the statute's legislative
history) constitute the validly enacted law. Thus, judicial use of legislative history
derives from and does not violate bicameralism and presentment. Six aspects of the
Constitution evidence this design.
First, the Constitution requires members of Congress to meet in one place at the
same time 74 Further, neither house may do business without a quorum,
75 and each
house may compel absent members to attend a legislative session.
6 Simply by
providing for representatives to meet with one another, the Founders chose a process
where debate and discussion would play a role.
Second, the Constitution's designated manner of representation anticipated an
exchange of differing views in Congress. In the Senate, where each state has equal
representation,77 small and large states would exchange views and achieve com-
promise. In the House, where the people are proportionally represented,"
8 local
interests and views would be expressed, with a national consensus emerging. In
each case, the goal is to bring various interests to bear on the lawmaking process.
And senators and representatives are not merely to register local preferences by
voting, but are also to act as filters who "refine and enlarge" those opinions through
debate with their colleagues.79 The resulting lawmaking would then reflect careful
debate and consideration of state and local interests.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
Year....").
7 Id. § 5, el. 1 ("LAI Majority of each (House] shall constitute a Quorum to do
Business .... ).
'6 Id. (Congress is "authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such
Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.").
" Id. § 3, cl. I ('The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from
each State .... ").
" Id. § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives... shall be apportioned among the several States which
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers ...."). The
method of representation is not strictly proportional, however, because each state is
guaranteed at least one representative in the House regardless of population. Id. ("[E]ach
State shall have at Least one Representative .... ").
"9 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961). The
purpose of a republican government, where law is made by representatives, is:
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial consid-
erations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public
voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more
consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people them-
selves, convened for the purpose.
Id.
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Third, as evidence of the public function of legislative debate, both houses of
Congress are to keep a public journal of their proceedings.8" Starting with the
Annals of Congress in 1789, both the House and the Senate have kept records setting
forth votes taken and summaries of floor debates. Today, the Congressional Record
carries on that task. In these journals, senators and representatives give reasons for
their actions, hoping to justify those actions to one another and to their constit-
uents.8 ' When federal legislators stand for re-election, senators every six years 2
and representatives every two years,8 3 the electorate may then hold federal legis-
lators accountable.
Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
described the journal requirement in similar terms:
The object of the [journal requirement] is to insure publicity to
the proceedings of the legislature, and a correspondent respon-
sibility of the members to their respective constituents. And it
is founded in sound policy and deep political foresight. Intrigue
and cabal are thus deprived of some of their main resources, by
plotting and devising measures in secrecy. The public mind is
enlightened by an attentive examination of the public measures;
patriotism, and integrity, and wisdom obtain their due reward;
and votes are ascertained, not by vague conjecture, but by
positive facts....
... So long as known and open responsibility is valuable as
a check, or an incentive among the representatives of a free
people, so long a journal of their proceedings and their votes,
published in the face of the world, will continue to enjoy public
favor, and be demanded by public opinion. 4
80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Each house is required to:
keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy;
and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any
question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on
the Journal.
Id.
Sl See Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive
Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1330-39 (2000) (proposing a public justification theory of
legislative interpretation, based on Congress's need to justify its legislative judgments to the
electorate).
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
83 Id. § 2, cl. 1.
84 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§
840-41 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001) (1833).
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Further, as a senator or representative needs her colleagues' votes to enact legisla-
tion, debate and persuasion are one way to garner support.8 5 It would be strange
indeed to ignore these public justifications, offered to persuade the people and
their representatives as to a law's propriety, when later applying that same law
against the people.86 In our republican government premised on accountable
legislation, public statements in the legislative record should receive weight in
statutory interpretation. 7
Fourth, the Constitution grants both houses of Congress power over their rules
of procedure.88 As deliberative bodies, the House and Senate need rules that deter-
mine how a subject is raised, who may speak, when and for how long they may
speak, how to end discussion of a subject, and similar rules necessary for orderly
debate.89 The final vote on a bill is only one step in a long and sometimes arduous
legislative process. Indeed, steps well before the final vote, such as drafting changes
in committee, 9° struggling to get a bill out of committee,9' or even the order of
voting on alternative proposals,92 often prove to be a bill's defining moment.93
These steps provide the context within which a statute derives its meaning; the
mechanical act of voting, though essential, offers little additional insight.
85 Some commentators discuss this point as the concept of veto-gates. See McNollgast,
Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 7 (1994). Certain points in the legislative process provide an
opportunity for legislators to effectively stifle (veto) a bill unless they are persuaded to do
otherwise. See id. at 18-19. Comments or promises made to move the bill through one of
these veto-gates should be given special interpretive weight as passage through that gate was
a necessary condition of enactment. See id. at 37.
86 See Bell, supra note 81, at 1333-39.
87 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1584-85
(1988).
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings ....").
89 See generally CHARLES W. JOHNSON, How OUR LAWS ARE MADE (22d ed. 2000),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.toc.htrnl (last visited Feb. 6, 2005)
(providing an overview of the federal legislative process); CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE (1989).
90 See generally Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing
Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U.L. REv. 891 (1987).
9' See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 2-23 (discussing the struggle to get the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 out of the House Judiciary Committee).
92 See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIALCHOICE AND INDIVIDUALVALUES 2-3 (2d ed. 1963)
(explaining that pairwise voting on multiple proposals will not guarantee rational translation
of individual preferences to social choice).
9' See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 2-36 (describing procedural hurdles
in the path of enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including getting the bill out of the
House Rules Committee and overcoming a Senate filibuster).
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Fifth, the Constitution protects representatives and senators from both arrest
while attending a session of Congress and punishment for words spoken on the
floors of their respective chambers.94 This guarantee allows federal legislators to
speak their minds, unafraid of prosecution and conviction by a hostile executive or
judiciary, respectively.95 To the Framers, this freedom enhanced the separation of
powers, leaving legislative debate unconstrained by fear of attack by a coordinate
branch.96 It seems odd indeed for judges to disregard the fruits of such debates when
interpreting statutes, preferring instead a context of their own choosing. In doing
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
Senators and Representatives ... shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
Id. For a review of the history of these guarantees, see Alexander J. Celia, The Doctrine of
Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a
Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 3-16 (1968); Terence
M. Fitzpatrick, Comment, The Speech or Debate Clause: Has the Eighth Circuit Gone Too
Far?, 68 UMKC L. REv. 771, 775-81 (2000). See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973)
(finding that official immunity does not extend to acts outside the sphere of legitimate legis-
lative activity); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972) (explaining that the
privilege applies to both members of Congress and their aides when those aides are perform-
ing legislative functions); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (concluding that
a senator could be prosecuted for bribery without being shielded by the Speeach and Debate
Clause because the crime did not necessitate an inquiry into legislative acts or motives);
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (stating that legislators "should be pro-
tected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of
defending themselves," but finding the doctrine not clearly applicable to employees); United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966) (holding that judicial evaluation of a speech given
on the floor of the House, in determining whether the representative conspired to deliver the
speech for pay, was prohibited by Article I).
" See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178-85.
96 The Court has explained the separation of powers point as follows:
Behind these simple phrases lies a history of conflict between the
Commons and the Tudor and Stuart monarchs during which successive
monarchs utilized the criminal and civil law to suppress and intimidate
critical legislators. Since the Glorious Revolution in Britain, and
throughout United States history, the privilege has been recognized as
an important protection of the independence and integrity of the
legislature. In the American governmental structure the clause serves
the additional function of reinforcing the separation of powers so
deliberately established by the Founders.... The legislative privilege,
protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and
conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the "practical
security" for ensuring the independence of the legislature.
Id. at 178-79 (citations omitted).
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so, the judiciary would seem to accomplish indirectly that which it could not do
directly. While the Constitution prohibits the judiciary from imposing legal punish-
ment on legislative speech, the Court indirectly punishes legislators by ignoring
such speech and debate when implementing their handiwork.
Sixth, after a bill passes the House and Senate, it is presented to the President,
who has ten days to review the bill with his cabinet.97 The President may then ask
executive officials for their written advice. 9 If the President decides to veto a bill,
he shall send the bill back to Congress with a public statement explaining the
grounds for the veto.99 By allowing the President time for reflection and an oppor-
tunity for counsel, the Constitution expects the President's decision to be
deliberative.I ° Along with the congressional debates, the President's signing or
veto statements constitute a statute's public context, and it is that public context
that the People will use when judging their representatives and the President at the
next election.
These constitutional provisions reveal bicameralism and presentment as a
constitutional process, where legislators debate and sometimes produce legislation.
This point should be crucial to Justice Scalia. No other context one might use to
interpret a federal statute has this constitutional pedigree. Because legislative
history is the best evidence of what occurred during the bicameralism and present-
ment process, that material provides a constitutionally-preferred context for
interpreting statutory text.'0'
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within
ten days (Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a
Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it .... ").
98 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (stating that the President "may require the Opinion, in writing, of
the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Offices").
99 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at
large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.").
" For example, before signing the bill that created the first Bank of the United States,
President George Washington sought written opinions from Attorney General Edmund
Randolph, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton. See Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1107, 1120
(2000). And before exercising his first veto, which disapproved a bill apportioning the House
of Representatives, President Washington sought written opinions regarding the constitu-
tionality of the law. See George Washington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), reprinted in 1
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 124
(James D. Richardson ed., 1896); 2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 119 (1792) (reporting that
President Washington's veto message was received by the House, and the House failed to
override the veto by the necessary two-thirds vote); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 907 (1989-1990).
"' On the centrality of this context to statutory meaning, see Solan, supra note 3, at 256
("We should not insulate ourselves from the context in which legally significant words were
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We can now see how Justice Scalia's non-delegation argument is a red herring.
Recall his argument that consulting legislative history, such as committee reports,
impermissibly delegates lawmaking power to a subset of Congress. 0 2 Because the
Constitution vests the legislative power in the entire Congress, this delegation is
forbidden. This argument, however, poses a false choice between, on the one hand,
meaning that resides in the text and, on the other hand, meaning that resides in
legislative history. The choice is false because text does not have determinate
meaning outside of a context. When Justice Scalia refers to plain text, what he
really means is text understood in some context other than the statute's legislative
history. Thus, the real choice is not between text and legislative history, but rather
between text understood within its legislative history and text understood within
some other context.
This entirely reframes the non-delegation argument as a question of what
context ought to control a statute's meaning.10 3 Again, the process of bicameralism
uttered if we care about ascertaining what the speaker intended to convey."); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 262-69 (1990) (discussing the
"[p]lain-[m]eaning [f]allacy" that ignores relevant interpretive context).
102 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
103 Here, Professor Manning's argument offers significantly more than Justice Scalia's by
adding a refinement to the bicameralism and presentment argument. Like Justice Scalia, he
argues that judicial use of legislative history effectively allows delegation of congressional
lawmaking power to the subset of Congress that created the legislative history material.
Manning, supra note 44, at 718 ("If courts give authoritative weight to committee reports or
sponsors' statements, the enactment of vague or ambiguous statutory language transfers
the majority's discretion (within the range of possible meanings) to a legislative committee
or sponsor."). Going beyond Justice Scalia's account, he argues that this shift of "law
elaboration" from the whole Congress to a subset of Congress impermissibly makes
legislating less costly. Id. at 719 ("Using legislative history to that end allows Congress
to shift law elaboration from the full legislative process to the less cumbersome process
of generating legislative history."). Yet, the Framers intentionally made the legislative
process - bicameralism and presentment - so costly that lawmaking would not be too easy.
Id. If Congress wants to make a cost-saving delegation of the "law elaboration" function,
thereby bypassing the costly bicameralism and presentment process, he argues, it must
delegate that function to an actor over which it has no control, such as the courts or an
administrative agency. Id. This leaves Congress with two choices. On the one hand, Congress
can use the bicameralism and presentment process to place its preferred meaning in the text.
On the other hand, Congress can leave statutory text ambiguous, leaving "law elaboration"
to federal actors beyond its control.
In formulating this argument, Professor Manning makes the same analytical move as
Justice Scalia - he artificially severs statutory text and context. In doing so, he never ade-
quately answers an important objection: Why not read legislators as adopting a statutory text
as understood against the backdrop of its legislative history? Congress adopts as law the text
in context, with the courts and executive agencies free to interpret and implement that law.
This view seems persuasive given three facts about the legislative process: (1) legislators are
aware that legislative history materials are created as a matter of course, (2) legislators have
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and presentment is the constitutionally-prescribed context of a statute, and legisla-
tive history memorializes that context. Any other context lacks this constitutional
legitimacy. Only by rejecting legislative history, and thereby selecting a different
context for interpreting statutory text, does a judge delegate lawmaking power -
the power to choose statutory context - outside of constitutional channels.
B. Inadequate Notice
By rejecting legislative history, Justice Scalia has created his own notice
problem. Recall that he criticizes resort to legislative history because it makes
statutory interpretation infinitely manipulable and indeterminate."° Consequently,
we cannot predict which interpretation ultimately will prevail, and we lack advance
notice of precisely what the statute requires.
Rejecting legislative history does not solve the notice problem. Without
legislative history, a judge must look elsewhere for context to give meaning to
statutory text, and the source of that context will necessarily lie outside of the text.
Further, because Justice Scalia offers no guidance in selecting an interpretive
context, the judge's unguided discretion will determine statutory meaning, i.e., what
the law is. Without an explanation or guiding principle, any choice of context is
merely the rule of an unexplained judicial hunch, not the rule of law. 5
Further, given Justice Scalia's terms of debate, this rule of law problem cannot
be solved. If text is the only aspect of a statute that is law, context is by definition
outside law. Because every act of interpretation requires a choice of context, every
regular access to such legislative history materials, and (3) legislators are free to vote against
a bill if they disagree with any material in its legislative history. Because legislative history
can be a basis for voting against a statute, just as can the text, it is difficult to envision how
legislative history is any less subject to the strictures of bicameralism and presentment than
text. See CharlesTiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court,
2000 Wis. L. REV. 205, 262-64. That a given legislator has neither the time nor the desire
to read the legislative history should be of no consideration. As with all human beings, legis-
lators decide what level of information gathering is rational for a given decision. See
RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the economics
of information). They may read the bill's entire text and legislative history, or they may rely
on the judgment of colleagues, staff or committee bill summaries, or their constituents'
expressed desires. That is, and should be, their choice. Indeed, if a legislator sees no need to
read a bill's final text before voting, both Justice Scalia and Professor Manning honor that
decision and nonetheless accept the statute's text. Yet, simply because the legislator exer-
cised the same discretion as to the statute's context (including its legislative history), they
reject that source of meaning. Neither Justice Scalia nor Professor Manning adequately meet
this argument.
14 See supra Part I.B.3.
105 For further elaboration of this point, see McGreal, Slighting Context, supra note 39,
at 368-71.
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act of interpretation necessarily entails resort to sources beyond law. Thus, under
Justice Scalia's argument, the rule of law is hopelessly inconsistent with the endeavor
of statutory interpretation.1 6
This problem is solved by adopting the expanded conception of bicameralism
and presentment defended above. Because bicameralism and presentment are
significant as a process, they provide both a text and a context with the constitu-
tional status of law.
C. Disguised Personal Preference
Recall that we treated two related arguments under this heading. First, Justice
Scalia argues that legislative history places no limits on judicial discretion.'07 In this
way, legislative history disguises the judge's personal preferences and prejudices.
Second, he argues that legislative history is unreliable because legislators use it to
mislead later readers. 08 In this way, legislative history reflects a legislator's per-
sonal preferences, inserted to thwart the will of Congress reflected in statutory text.
The next two sections address each argument in turn.
1. Unbounded Judicial Discretion
According to Justice Scalia, legislative history's inherent manipulability allows
judges to covertly implement their personal policy preferences under the guise of
statutory interpretation.'09 Because legislative history can be bent to support any
result, it cannot constrain judicial discretion. And if legislative history cannot
decide cases, then something else - something unacknowledged, such as personal
ideology - must do so.
Yet again, Justice Scalia's textualism fares no better. Only by ignoring the
choice of context does he avoid discretion. For example, as discussed above, the
words "Keep off the grass" appear to have a natural meaning when said by a drug
counselor or a gardener."0 In each case, we attribute meaning so effortlessly that
we may forget that context does much of the analytical heavy lifting."' This
becomes apparent when those same words appear outside of a concrete context.
Then, choice of context becomes conscious, as we must hypothesize a context
"0 As previously noted, Professor Manning identifies a similar gap in Justice Scalia's
textualist argument. See Manning, supra note 44. Ultimately, however, his attempt to fill that
gap is unpersuasive. Id.
07 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
"o See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
10 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
"' See Solan, supra note 3, at 252-54.
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within which to understand the words. The act of hypothesizing a context entails
a choice no less than deciding which portion of legislative history to credit.
The question, then, is whether hypothesizing a statutory context is any more
constrained than applying legislative history. As Justice Scalia practices the
method, hypothesizing context appears less constrained. He neither acknowledges
the need to choose a context, nor provides a standard or method for making that
choice. Without standards, the decision is wholly unconstrained, leaving maximum
discretion. With legislative history, there is at least the need to find and cite some
legislative material that supports the judge's preferred interpretation. Whether such
material exists is outside of the judge's control; if supportive legislative history does
not exist, the judge may not conjure it up on her own. With Justice Scalia's hypo-
thetical contexts, however, both the chosen words and their context spring from the
judge's imagination. No external source circumscribes that choice, leaving the
judge free to manipulate the hypothetical context to suit her preferred interpretation.
Further, Justice Scalia's choice of hypothetical context goes unacknowledged,
increasing the danger of manipulation. Readers of an opinion may miss that a
choice has in fact been made, allowing this discretion to go unexamined and thus
unchallenged. Even when detected, the choice will be difficult to critique because
the judge does not supply her reasons. Without previously recorded reasons, the
judge may offer ex post facto rationalizations, or simply change the reasons offered
depending on the critiques that emerge while drafting her opinion. This is partic-
ularly offensive to a court that eschews the practice of rendering decisions with
opinions to follow at a later date. The rationale offered for this prohibition is that
the need to justify a decision in a contemporaneous writing both affects the ulti-
mate decision and constrains the decision maker's options." 2 Leaving the choice
of hypothetical conversation unacknowledged increases the decision maker's dis-
cretion, thereby increasing the room for manipulation.
2. Tainted Words
Aside from its manipulability, Justice Scalia criticizes legislative history as in-
herently unreliable."3 Specifically, he complains that interest groups and legislators
1"' See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONS'TrUION: THE SUPREME COURT'S
OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN
UNDERSTAND (1992); Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 9-20 (1999)
(discussing lawmakers' obligation to explain theirdecisions); PaulE. McGreal, Constitutional
Illiteracy, 30 IND. L. REv. 693, 708-14 (1997) (reviewing LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN &
MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
(1996)) (arguing that we ought to care whether ordinary citizens can understand our consti-
tutional government).
1"3 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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fill the legislative record with language that they could not get into the statute's
text." 4 They use legislative history to win battles lost in drafting the legislation
itself. Consequently, legislative history does not illuminate a statute's meaning so
much as deceive later interpreters of the statute.1 5
Here, Justice Scalia makes an argument without precedent in our constitutional
tradition. Namely, he uses the presumed subjective motivation of legislators to
question the validity of their work product. While genuine legislative history -
legislative history that reflects genuine debate about the meaning and substance of
a bill - would be probative of a statute's meaning,'" 6 Justice Scalia takes judicial
notice that much legislative history is not genuine - that it is inserted in the legis-
lative record to mislead later interpreters." 7 Instead of examining such materials
on a case-by-case basis, as do some of his colleagues, Justice Scalia irrebuttably
presumes that bad motives underlie all legislative history materials." 8
Justice Scalia's conclusive impugning of legislative motives contradicts many
established practices and principles in constitutional law."9 First, in reviewing
federal and state statutes, the Court begins with a presumption of constitutionality; 2 °
"' See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
16 See Scalia, supra note 11, at 34.
117 See, e.g., id. at 36-37 (relying on his experience as "head of the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Justice Department" to estimate the amount of time that lawyers spent on
researching legislative history). Not surprisingly, other commentators offer different
anecdotal accounts. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845,867 (1992) ("My experience running the staff of the Senate
Judiciary Committee led me to conclude that elected officials seriously consider public
interest arguments and act upon them .. "); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on
the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 167 (1988) ("The politicians and other
people I have known in public life just do not fit the 'rent-seeking' egoist model that the
public choice theorists offer."). More importantly, the empirical evidence undercuts Justice
Scalia's gestalt impression.
I1l Scalia, supra note 11, at 34.
"19 Professor Charles Tiefer argues that recent political science literature undermines the
empirical basis for this argument. See Tiefer, supra note 103, at 264-71. Specifically,
Professor Tiefer notes that this argument assumes that congressional committees are captured
by interest groups and thus their views will diverge from those of Congress as a whole. Id.
at 264-65. But, after the 1994 turnover in Congress, we saw significant changes in voting
patterns even though there was no appreciable change in interest groups. Id. at 266.
("Changing the chairs of the congressional committees changed outcomes, often to a large
degree, without any necessary shift in interest groups."). Id. Further, analysis of committee
and congressional voting patterns reveals that "voting in most committees matched, more or
less, voting in their chambers." Id. at 267.
120 See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,992 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Statutes
are presumed constitutional .. "); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (noting
that the Supreme Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned from
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the challenger bears the burden to establish unconstitutionality.12 Further, in most
areas of constitutional law, the Court refuses to look beyond the legislature's
asserted purpose for its legislation.122 For example, in Equal Protection Clause
cases, the Court has consistently examined the government's asserted purpose in
enacting economic regulations, rejecting arguments based on legislators' purported
subjective biases. 123 And even a law that discriminates based on race may be upheld
the face of the statute."); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1901) ("The
presumptions are in favor of constitutionality, and before a court is justified in holding that
the legislative power has been exercised beyond the limits granted, or in conflict with
restrictions imposed by the fundamental law, the excess or conflict should be clear."). The
Court elaborated on this presumption in the Equal Protection case of Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312 (1993), where it upheld a statute that applied a different standard of proof for committing
mentally ill and mentally retarded individuals:
A State . . .has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification. "[A] legislative choice is not
subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational
speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." A statute is
presumed constitutional, and "[tihe burden is on the one attacking the
legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which
might support it," whether or not the basis has a foundation in the
record. Finally, courts are compelled under rational-basis review to
accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect
fit between means and ends. A classification does not fail rational-basis
review because it "'is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality."' "The problems of govern-
ment are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations - illogical, it may be, and unscientific."
Id. at 320-21 (citations omitted).
121 In some areas, the burden shifts to the government once the challenger has made a
threshold showing. For example, once a litigant has shown that a statute discriminates based
on race, the government must show that the challenged law is necessary to accomplish a
compelling government interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(holding that federal affirmative action programs must meet a strict scrutiny standard); see
also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.3.2 (2d
ed. 2002); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTiONAL LAW § 16-6 (2d ed. 1988).
122 See generally J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in
Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 953, 956 (1978); Theodore Eisenberg,
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52
N.Y.U. L. REv. 36 (1977); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in
Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1219 (1998);
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996).
123 See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003); Nordlinger v.
Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). The Court explained the appropriate standard of review:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible
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if the government can satisfy strict scrutiny.1 24 In these areas, the Court consistently
assumes a baseline of legislative good faith, either rejecting inquiry into legislative
motivation, or placing a heavy burden on those seeking to overturn government
action on that basis.
Second, Justice Scalia's assault on legislative motive flies in the face of
separation of powers concerns, which counsel judicial restraint when examining the
inner-workings of Congress or the Executive Branch. 25 Consider Field v. Clark,'26
where the Court was asked to decide whether the identical bill text had passed both
houses of Congress and been signed by the President. If not, it was argued, the
statute was invalid as the same bill had not properly passed the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment. 27 The Court was urged to scrutinize the legislative
process, lest "it becomes possible for the Speaker of the House of Representatives
policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the
classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered
to be true by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of
the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the
distinction arbitrary or irrational.
Id. at 11 (internal citations omitted); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,
464 (1981) ("Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the
classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering
evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken."). The Court may use its means-end
Equal Protection analysis to determine whether there is a dangerous probability that a
specific statute was motivated by bias. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see also Paul E. McGreal, The Role of
Suspicion in Federal Equal Protection, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 183, 185-88 (1999)
[hereinafter McGreal, Role of Suspicion]. However, in each of these cases, the Court relied
on factors indicating that the statute at issue was impermissibly motivated, rather than
impugning legislative motives wholesale. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 322-24 (upholding
discrimination between the mentally ill and mentally retarded because the record did not
contain any indications of impermissible bias against the mentally retarded); see also FCC
v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) ("In areas of social and economic
policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification."); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,97 (1979) ("The Constitution presumes that,
absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified
by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter
how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.") (footnote omitted).
24 See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (applying strict scrutiny to a federal contracting minority
set-aside program); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to a state contracting minority set-aside program).
125 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1892).
126 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
127 Id. at 672.
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and the President of the Senate to impose upon the people as a law a bill that was
never passed by Congress."1 2' The Court declined this invitation:
[T]his possibility is too remote to be seriously considered in the
present inquiry. It suggests a deliberate conspiracy to which the
presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills and the
clerks of the two houses must necessarily be parties, all acting
with a common purpose to defeat an expression of the popular
will in the mode prescribed by the Constitution. Judicial action
based upon such a suggestion is forbidden by the respect due to
a coordinate branch of the government.'29
Congress's internal lawmaking processes are entitled to a conclusive presumption
of regularity.
Third, the same aversion to questioning legislative motives appears in cases
applying the Speech and Debate Clause.'30 The Clause immunizes members of
Congress and their aides' from civil and criminal liability for legislative acts, such
as voting, drafting legislation and committee reports, and speeches and debates on
the floor of Congress. 3 2 In United States v. Johnson,'33 the federal government
prosecuted Thomas Johnson, a U.S. Representative, for a speech delivered on the
128 id.
129 Id. at 672-73 (emphasis added).
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Members
of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
131 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972) ("It is true that the Clause itself
mentions only 'Senators and Representatives,' but prior cases have plainly not taken a
liberalistic approach in applying the privilege.").
112 While the Clause speaks only of "any Speech or Debate in either House," U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 6, cl. 1, the Court has broadly interpreted this phrase to include "the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,376 (1951). See Gravel,
408 U.S. at 617 ("The Clause also speaks only of 'Speech or Debate,' but the Court's
consistent approach has been that to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause
to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view. Committee reports,
resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered . . . ."); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 204 (1881) (The rule covers "[iun short, .. . things generally done in a session of
the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it."). Extra-legislative
activities are not protected by the Clause, such as selling the publication rights to con-
gressional documents to a private publisher, Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625 ("[P]rivate publication
by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essential to the
deliberations of the Senate; nor does questioning as to private publication threaten the
integrity or independence of the Senate by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to exec-
utive influence."), or interfering with the workings of executive agencies, United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966).
133 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
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House floor. The United States alleged that the speech was part of a conspiracy
among Johnson, fellow House members, and a savings and loan company whereby
the company would pay Johnson and his colleagues to convince the Justice
Department to drop mail fraud indictments against the savings and loan company.'34
One count of the indictment charged Johnson with accepting money in exchange for
delivering a congressional speech defending the savings and loan company.'35 The
charge rested on a federal statute that punished any member of Congress who
"receives.. ., any compensation for any services rendered or to be rendered, .... in
relation to any proceeding,... in which the United States is. .. directly or indirectly
interested,"136 as well as a federal statute that punished any person who conspires "to
defraud the United States."'3 The Court explained that "[t]he essence of such a
charge... is that the Congressman's conduct was improperly motivated.' 3' The
question, then, was whether the Speech and Debate Clause protected members of
Congress from legal proceedings that questioned their motives in making statements
before Congress. 1
39
The Court rejected any inquiry into a legislator's motives:
However reprehensible such conduct may be, we believe the
Speech or Debate Clause extends at least so far as to prevent it
114 Id. at 171-72.
115 Id. at 184. The indictment read in relevant part:
It was a part of said conspiracy that the said THOMAS F. JOHNSON
should... render services, for compensation,.., to wit, the making of
a speech, defending the operations of Maryland's 'independent'
savings and loan associations, the financial stability and solvency
thereof, and the reliability and integrity of the 'commercial insurance'
on investments made by said 'independent' savings and loan
associations, on the floor of the House of Representatives.
Id.
136 Id. at 170-71 n.l.
117 Id. at 171 n.2.
3 Id. at 180.
"3 The Court explained that the trial proceedings deeply probed Representative Johnson's
preparation for the speech:
Extensive questioning went on concerning how much of the speech
was written by Johnson himself, how much by his administrative
assistant, and how much by outsiders representing the loan company.
The government attorney asked Johnson specifically about certain
sentences in the speech, the reasons for their inclusion and his personal
knowledge of the factual material supporting those statements. In
closing argument the theory of the prosecution was very clearly depen-
dent upon the wording of the speech. In addition to questioning the
manner of preparation and the precise ingredients of the speech, the
Government inquired into the motives for giving it.
Id. at 173-76.
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from being made the basis of a criminal charge against a
member of Congress of conspiracy to defraud the United States
by impeding the due discharge of government functions.'"
Allowing judicial inquiry into legislative motive, especially in a proceeding initiated
by the Executive Branch, would impermissibly erode legislative independence.
Otherwise, "critical or disfavored legislators" could be attacked in "a judicial forum"
on vague allegations of improper motive."' Preventing such attacks "is the pre-
dominate thrust of the Speech or Debate Clause."'
42
Fourth, hesitancy to question legislative motives has venerable roots, appearing
in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck.'43 Fletcher involved an
attempt to invalidate a private land grant by the Georgia legislature.' The challen-
gers alleged that members of the Georgia legislature were promised an interest in
the land in exchange for passing the land grant. 4 This alleged promise "unduly
influenced" the state legislators, making the resulting legislative land grant, and its
purported transfer, "a nullity."'"6 Chief Justice Marshall framed the issue as
whether"the validity of a law depends upon the motives of its framers, and how
far the particular inducements, operating on members of the supreme sovereign
power of a state, to the formation of a contract by that power, are examinable in a
court of justice."'' 47
Chief Justice Marshall denied judicial review on two grounds. First, he noted
two practical difficulties with assessing legislative motives: "If the majority of the
legislature be corrupted, it may well be doubted, whether it be within the province
of the judiciary to control their conduct, and, if less than a majority act from impure
motives, the principle by which judicial interference would be regulated, is not
clearly discerned."'148 On the one hand, courts are powerless to affect a legislature
controlled by a corrupt majority. With neither the power of the sword nor the power
of the purse, they have little (if any) ammunition to fight such forces. 49 On the
other hand, if corruption is confined to a minority of the legislature, courts have no
administrable standard to determine when such corruption should invalidate a law.
With no basis for deciding, judges should stay out of the controversy.
14 Id. at 180.
141 Id. at 182.
142 id.
141 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
144 Id.
141 Id. at 129.
146 Id.
141 Id. at 130.
148 Id.
149 See McGreal, Role of Suspicion, supra note 123, at 1147-48 (discussing the relatively
weak position of the judiciary).
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Second, on principle, judges ought not entertain such challenges to legislative
motive. Chief Justice Marshall characterized such suits as "indecent, in the
extreme,"15 as they insult the dignity of a collateral branch of government. If the
challenged law is one:
which the legislature might constitutionally pass, if the act be
clothed with all the requisite forms of a law, a court, sitting as a
court of law, cannot sustain a suit brought by one individual
against another founded on the allegation that the act is a nullity,
in consequence of the impure motives which influenced certain
members of the legislature which passed the law. 5'
The remedy for ill-considered or improperly motivated laws is the political process,
where citizens can vote the offending legislators out of office.'
52
Fifth, the Constitution empowers each chamber to regulate its own pro-
ceedings. 5 3 Under this power, early Congresses established an embryonic form of
the legislative process we have today, replete with a committee system and rules of
procedure. Unless a chamber's rules violate some independent constitutional pro-
vision,"t the Court has not second-guessed a chamber's method of proceeding.
5
These constitutional principles counsel against wholesale rejection of legislative
history. As Justice Scalia acknowledges by grounding his textualism on the consti-
tutional process of bicameralism and presentment, statutory interpretation is a
practice that must make sense under our Constitution. As bicameralism and present-
ment is the constitutionally-appointed context that gives statutes their meaning, and
legislative history is evidence of that context, no federal court should ignore legis-
lative history merely because anecdotal evidence suggests that some of those
"So Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 131.
151 id.
152 Id. at 144 (Johnson, J., separate opinion).
1' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel
a Member.").
'54 For example, a House rule barring African Americans from committee service would
violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38
(1993) (explaining that while the Senate has the sole power to try impeachments, which is
a power that it may exercise free from judicial review, the Court will review whether the
Senate has violated other provisions of the Constitution in exercising that power).
... United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (While Congress may not "ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.... within these limitations all matters
of method are open to the determination of the House [and t]he power to make rules is...
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal.").
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materials might be suspect. To do so would be to conclusively presume legislative
bad faith, which the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to do.
To be clear, I am not arguing that every scrap of legislative history has equal
importance. As with any other aspect of context, each piece must be weighed
against the others to consider how well it describes the overall context of enactment.
The Supreme Court has done just that in according different weight to different
types of legislative history. 5 6 For example, the Court gives drafting history heavy
weight, as it shows the different choices made in crafting statutory language.'57
Similarly, a legislator's or committee's explanation of a "text's pedigree" can offer
guidance on interpretation,'58 and a conference committee report may shed signifi-
cant light on a statute's meaning. ' This parsimonious approach mirrors the Court's
attitude toward Congress in other areas - assume a baseline of legislative good
faith, loosening or abandoning that assumption as the circumstances require.
CONCLUSION
Parsing legislative history is not likely to be easy. But as Justice Scalia himself
concedes, ease of application is not the Holy Grail of our quest."r Rather, we seek
an interpretive approach that makes sense both on its own terms and according to
the tenets of American constitutional government. Justice Scalia's rejection of
legislative history fails these twin demands because it ignores the inseparability of
text and context.
156 See Tiefer, supra note 103, at 232-50 (discussing the Court's recent use of various
types of legislative history). But see Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of
Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1833,
1879-81 (1998) (criticizing the Court's hierarchy of legislative history materials).
157 Tiefer, supra note 103, at 233 ("Drafting history consists of the record of when
changes occurred in a bill's language, from introduction to final passage. It is distinct from
explanations along the way of why those changes occur, or other explanations along the way
of the bill."); see, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-29 (1997) (using drafting history
to interpret the federal habeas corpus statute).
158 Tiefer, supra note 103, at 237 ("[T]he text's pedigree, i.e., the text's antecedents, such
as prior statutes or other prior public law, which the bill purports to codify or use as a guide
for subsequent legal interpreters."); see, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)
(using a statute's textual pedigree to interpret a federal caijacking statute).
159 Tiefer, supra note 103, at 233.
A conference committee produces a report in two parts: bill
language, typically a compromise between the bill language passed by
the House and that passed by the Senate, submitted to the House and
Senate for final passage; and a "joint explanatory statement of the
managers" that explains what the conference committee did.
Id.; see, e.g., Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264 (1996) (using a
conference committee report to interpret a banking statute).
160 Scalia, supra note 11, at 45.
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On its own terms, rejecting legislative history, without saying more, makes little
sense. Text cannot be understood absent a context. Rejecting legislative history
simply eliminates one possible interpretive context, without identifying some other
context to fill the interpretive void. Thus, the textualist account is incomplete.
Rejecting legislative history also fails the test of consistency with constitutional
government. While Justice Scalia offers bicameralism and presentment as the
constitutional measuring stick, he follows his logic only half way - he accepts
the text produced by that process, but not the context. This separation of text and
context cannot be justified. Because legislative history reflects the context of
bicameralism and presentment, it provides the constitutionally preferred context for
determining statutory meaning.
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